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Abstract
We consider an online regression setting in which individuals adapt to the regression model:
arriving individuals may access the model throughout the process, and invest strategically in
modifying their own features so as to improve their assigned score. We find that this strategic
manipulation may help a learner recover the causal variables, in settings where an agent can
invest in improving impactful features that also improve his true label. We show that even
simple behavior on the learner’s part (i.e., periodically updating her model based on the observed
data so far, via least-square regression) allows her to simultaneously i) accurately recover which
features have an impact on an agent’s true label, provided they have been invested in significantly,
and ii) incentivize agents to invest in these impactful features, rather than in features that have
no effect on their true label.
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1 Introduction
As algorithmic decision-making takes a more and more important role in myriad application do-
mains, incentives emerge to change the inputs presented to these algorithms—people may either
invest in truly relevant attributes or strategically lie about their data. Recently, a collection of very
interesting papers has explored various models of strategic behavior on the part of the classified indi-
viduals in learning settings, and ways to mitigate the harms to accuracy that can arise from falsified
features Dalvi et al. [2004], Brückner et al. [2012], Hardt et al. [2016], Dong et al. [2018]. Addition-
ally, some recent work has focused on the design of learning algorithms that incentivize the classified
individuals to make “good” investments in true changes to their variables Kleinberg and Raghavan
[2019].
The present paper takes a different tack, and explores another potential effect of strategic invest-
ment in true changes to variables, in an online learning setting: we claim that interaction between
the online learning and the strategic individuals may actually aid the learning algorithm in iden-
tifying causal variables. By causal, we mean, informally, variables such that changes in their true
value cause changes in the true label and lead agents to improve. In contrast, non-causal variables
do not affect the true label; such features are susceptible to gaming, as they can be used to obtain
better outcomes with respect to the posted model without improving true labels.
The idea is quite simple. First, if a learning algorithm’s hypothesis at a particular round depends
heavily on a certain variable, this incentivizes the arriving individual to invest in improving that
variable. If that variable were causally related to the true label, then the learner would observe
the impact of these changes in the form of improved true labels. If that variable were non-causal,
the changes would not have an effect on true labels. Second, if a learning algorithm improves its
hypotheses over time, this changing sequence of incentives should encourage investment in a variety
of promising variables, exposing those that are causal. This process should naturally induce the
learner to shift its dependence towards causal variables, thereby incentivizing individuals to invest
in meaningful changes, and resulting in an overall higher-quality population.
The goal of this paper is to highlight this potential beneficial effect of the interaction between
online learning and strategic modification. To do so, we focus our study on a simple linear regression
setting. In our model, there is a true underlying latent regression parameter vector β∗, and there
is an underlying distribution over unmodified feature vectors. On every round t, the learner must
announce a regression vector βˆt.
1 An individual then appears, with an unmodified feature vector xt
chosen i.i.d. from the distribution. Before presenting himself to the learner, the individual observes
βˆt and has the opportunity to invest in changing his true features to some x¯t; we focus on a simple
model wherein the individual’s investment results in a targeted change to a single variable. The
individual then receives utility 〈βˆt, x¯t〉, and the learner gets feedback y¯t = β∗⊺x¯t + εt, where εt is
some noise.
Within this simple model, we consider simple behaviors for both the learner and the individuals:
At each time t, the individual modifies his features so as to maximize his utility given the posted
βˆt; periodically, the learner updates βˆt with her best estimate of β
∗ given the (modified) features
and labels she has observed, via least-square regression. Our main result is that under this simple
behavior, the learner recovers β∗ accurately, after observing sufficiently many individuals. Our
result is divided in two parts: first, we show that least-square regression accurately recovers β∗ with
1Eventually, the learner we will consider does not update its regression vector at every round, but rather periodi-
cally, so that individuals can be treated in batches.
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respect to features that many individuals have invested in. Second, we show that these dynamics
incentivize investments in every feature, leading to accurate recovery of β∗ in its entirety, under an
assumption on how the learner breaks ties between multiple least-square solutions. Our accuracy
guarantees for a feature improve with the number of times that feature is invested in.
It is important to emphasize that we focus on a settting in which individuals’ modifications of
their variables can be meaningful investments (e.g., studying to achieve better mastery of material
by an exam) rather than deceitful manipulations (e.g., cheating on the exam to achieve a higher
assessment of that mastery). The latter would not help to expose causal variables, because such
changes would not affect the outcome, regardless of whether the changes were in causal or non-causal
variables.
Notice that any discovery of causal variables that occurs in our model is a result of the interaction
between the online learner and the strategic individuals. On the one hand, online learning with
no strategic response has no ability to distinguish non-causal variables from causal ones when the
two are correlated. On the other hand, if strategic individuals faced with a static scoring algorithm
tried to maximize their scores by investing in a non-causal feature, the resulting information would
be insufficient for an observer to draw conclusions about the causality of other features.
For example, historical data might show that both a student’s grades in high school and the make
of car his parents drive to the university visit day are predictive of success in university. Suppose,
for simplicity, that success in high school is causally related to success in university, but that make
of parents’ car is not. If the university admissions process put large weight on high school grades,
that would incentivize students to invest effort in performing well in high school, which would also
observably pay off in university, which would reinforce the emphasis on high school grades. If the
admissions process put large weight on the make of car in which students arrive to the visit day, that
would incentivize renting fancy cars for visits. However, this would result in a different distribution
over the observed student variables, and on this modified distribution the correlation between cars
and university success would be weakened, and therefore the admissions formula would not perform
well. In future years, the university would naturally correct the formula to de-emphasize cars.
One reason that we find this natural process of causal variable discovery to be interesting is
that discovery of causal variables is notoriously difficult and problematic. Separating correlation
from causation in passive-observational data is essentially impossible without very strong assump-
tions Eberhardt [2007]. The gold standard traditional method for detecting causal variables is
therefore to perform an intervention, and the protypical intervention is the randomized, controlled
trial, a concept that grew out of the foundational work of R. A. Fisher in the 1930’s Fisher [1935].
Randomly assigning experimental subjects to “treatments” of different variables, however, is often
expensive, difficult, impossible, unethical, or not meaningful. If the variable is the neighborhood
where the subject lives, what does it mean to assign this at random? Even if it were feasible or ethi-
cal to consider reassigning subjects’ neighborhood for the purposes of an experiment, perhaps what
is relevant is not the value of the variable at the time of the experiment, but the lived experience
of having been identified with and experienced that variable and its correlates for a long period of
time.
We do not suggest that the interaction between online learning and strategic classification solves
all problems relating to causality; far from it. Our work aims to bring attention to a natural
mechanism based on re-training for exposing causal variables, that we believe is worthy of further
attention.
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Related work. Much of the work on decision-making on individuals assumes that an individual’s
data is a fixed input that is independent of the algorithm used by the decision-maker. In practice,
however, individuals may try to adapt to the model in place in order to improve their outcomes. A
recent line of work studies such strategic behavior in classification settings.
Part of this line of work concerns itself with the negative consequences of strategic behavior, when
individuals aim to game the model in place; for example, individuals may misrepresent their data or
features (often at a cost) in an effort to obtain positive qualification outcomes or otherwise manip-
ulate an algorithm’s output Dalvi et al. [2004], Perote and Perote-Pena [2004], Dekel et al. [2010],
Brückner et al. [2012], Ioannidis and Loiseau [2013], Horel et al. [2014], Cai et al. [2015], Hardt et al.
[2016], Dong et al. [2018], Chen et al. [2018, 2019] or even to protect their privacy Ghosh et al.
[2014], Cummings et al. [2015]. The goal in these works is to provide algorithms whose outputs are
robust to such gaming. Milli et al. [2019] and Hu et al. [2019] focus on the social impact of robust
classification, and show that i) robust classifiers come at a social cost (by forcing even qualified
individuals to invest in costly feature manipulations to be classified positively) and ii) disparate
abilities to game the model inevitably lead to unfair outcomes.
Another part of this line of work instead sees strategic manipulation as possibly positive,
when the classifier incentivizes individuals to invest in meaningfully improving their features—
e.g., a student may decide to study and actually improve his knowledge in order to raise his test
score. Kleinberg and Raghavan [2019], Ustun et al. [2019], Tabibian et al. [2019], Tsirtsis and Gomez-Rodriguez
[2020] and Haghtalab et al. [2020] study how to incentivize agents to invest effort into modifying
meaningful features that improve their labels. Much of this line of work assumes the decision-maker
already understands which features are impactful and control an agent’s true label or qualification
level, and which do not.
In contrast, we consider a setting where the decision-maker does not initially know which features
affect an agent’s label, and aims to leverage the agents’ strategic behavior to learn the causal
relationship between features and labels; in that sense, our work is related to a line of research on
causality Pearl [2009], Halpern [2016], Peters et al. [2017]. Most closely related to this paper is the
work of Miller et al. [2019], as well as the concurrent works of Perdomo et al. [2020] and Shavit et al.
[2020]. Miller et al. [2019] formalize the distinction between gaming and actual improvements by
introducing causal graphs that model the effect of their features and target variables on each other.
They show that in such settings, the decision-maker should incentivize actual improvements rather
than gaming, and that designing good incentives that push agents to improve is at least as hard
as causal inference. Shavit et al. [2020] study the sample complexity of learning a linear regression
model so as to either i) maximize the accuracy of the predictions, ii) maximize the agents’ self-
improvements, or iii) recover the causality structure of their problem. Perdomo et al. [2020] show
how re-training can lead to stable and optimal outcomes when the learner’s model affects the
distribution of agent features and labels; while our paper considers a similar re-training framework,
our assumptions differ from those of Perdomo et al. [2020].
2 Model
We consider a linear regression setting where the learner estimates the regression parameters based
on strategically manipulated data from a sequence of agents over rounds. There is a true latent
regression parameter β∗ ∈ [−1, 1]d that generates an agent’s label as a function of his feature vector.
That is, for any agent with feature vector x ∈ [−1, 1]d, the real-valued label y is obtained via
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y = β∗⊤x + ε, where ε is a noise random variable with |ε| ≤ σ, and E[ε | x] = 0. We also refer
to an individual’s features as variables. There is a distribution over the unmodified features x in
[−1, 1]d; we let µ be the mean and Σ be the covariance matrix of this distribution; we note that the
distribution of unmodified features may be degenerate, i.e. Σ may not be full-rank. Throughout
the paper, we set µ = 0.2
The agents and the learner interact in an online fashion. At time t, the learner first posts
a regression estimate βˆt ∈ Rd, then an agent (indexed by t) arrives with their unmodified feature
vector xt. Agent t modifies the feature xt into x¯t in response to βˆ
t, in order to improve their assigned
score 〈βˆt, x¯t〉. Finally, the learner observes the agent’s realized label after feature modification, given
by y¯t = β
∗⊺x¯t + εt.
Causal and non-causal features. When an agent modifies a feature k, this may also affect the
agent’s true label. We divide the coordinates of any feature vector x into causal and non-causal ;
causal features inform and control an agent’s label, while non-causal features are those that do not
affect an agent’s label. Formally, for any k ∈ [d], feature k is causal if and only if β∗(k) 6= 0, and non-
causal if and only if β∗(k) = 0. An agent t can modify his true label by modifying causal features.
As such, note that β∗ captures the underlying causal structure of our problem. The magnitude of
each feature captures the extent to which said feature is causal and affects the agents’ labels.
Agents’ responses. Agents are strategic: they modify their features so as to maximize their own
regression outcome;3 modifications are costly and agents are budgeted. We assume agent t incurs a
linear cost4 ct(∆t) =
∑d
k=1 ct(k) |∆t(k)| to change his features by ∆t, and has a total budget of Bt
to modify his features.
({ct(k)}k∈[d], Bt)’s are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution C that is unknown
to the analyst. We assume C has discrete support {(c1, B1) , . . . , (cl, Bl)}, and we denote by πi
the probability that (ct, Bt) =
(
ci, Bi
)
. We assume ci(k) > 0, Bi > 0 for all i ∈ [l], k ∈ [d]; that
is, every agent can modify his features, but no feature can be modified for free.5 When facing
regression parameters βˆ, agent t solves
M(βˆ, ct, Bt) = argmax
∆t
βˆ⊤ (xt +∆t) s.t.
d∑
k=1
ct(k)∆t(k) ≤ Bt;
That is, agent t strategically aims to maximize his predicted outcome given a budget of B for
modifying his features, when facing model βˆ. The solution of the above program does not depend
2This can be done whenever the learner can estimate the mean feature vector, since the learner can then center
the features. The learner could estimate the mean by using unlabeled historical data; for example, she could collect
data during a period when the algorithm does not make any decision on the agents, thus they would have no incentive
to modify their features.
3Importantly, our agents’ goal is not to cooperate with the learner. Agents are self-interested and aim to maximize
their own regression outcomes; they do not actively seek to help the learner improve the accuracy of her model. The
agents prefer when the learner emphasizes features that are easier to manipulate, even if said features are non-causal.
These incentives may be ill-aligned with the learner’s goal of optimizing predictive power and recovering causality,
which requires putting more weight on causal features.
4We make this assumption for simplicity. Our results extend to a more general class of cost functions that do not
induce modifications such that several features are modified in a perfectly correlated fashion. When several features
are perfectly correlated, said features may become indistinguishable to the learner.
5In our model, modifying a feature affects only that feature and the label, but does not affect the values of any
other features. We leave exploration of more complex models of feature intervention to future work.
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on xt, only on βˆ and (ct, Bt), and is given by
∆t =
d∑
k=1
sgn
(
βˆ(k)
)
1
{
k = argmax
j
∣∣∣βˆ(j)∣∣∣ /ct(j)
}
· Bt
ct(k)
,
up to tie-breaking; when several features maximize |βˆ(j)|/ct(j), the agent modifies a single one of
these features. We call Dτ the set of features that have been modified by at least one agent t ∈ [τ ].
Natural learner dynamics: batch least-squares regression. Our goal here is to identify
simple, natural learning dynamics that expose causal variables. Note that a simple way for the
learner to expose and leverage causal variables is to use an explore-first then exploit type of algo-
rithm: initially, the learner can post a model that focuses on a single feature at a time to observe
how changing this feature affects the distribution of agents labels. After sequentially exploring each
feature, the learner obtains an accurate estimate of β∗ that she can deploy for the remainder of the
time horizon. However, one may want to avoid such an approach that artificially separates features
in practice: posting models that ignore most of an agent’s attribute for the sake of learning may
not be desirable in real life. A bank may not want to offer loans “blindly” and willingly ignore most
of a customer’s data when making lending decisions just for the purpose of learning which features
are predictive of an agent’s ability to repay loans. Instead, in this paper, we focus on algorithms
based on re-training : i.e., periodically, the learner updates her model based on the data she has
observed so far, so as to keep it consistent with the history of agent behavior. A bank may be
willing to periodically update their loan decision rule in order to keep up with new, unexpected
agent behavior.
The dynamics we consider are formally given in Algorithm 1. It is possible that more sophis-
ticated learning algorithms could yield better guarantees with respect to regret and recovery; the
focus of this paper is on simple and natural dynamics rather than optimal ones.
When the learner updates his regression parameters, say at time τ , she does so based on the
agent data observed up until time τ . We model the learner as picking βˆ from the set LSE(τ) of
solutions to the least-square regression problem run on the agents’ data up until time τ , formally
defined as
LSE(τ) = argmin
β
τ∑
t=1
(
x¯⊤t β − y¯t
)2
.
We introduce notation that will be useful for regression analysis. We let X¯τ ∈ Rτ×d be the matrix
of (modified) observations up until time τ . Each row corresponds to an agent t ∈ [τ ], and agent t’s
row is given by x¯⊤t . Similarly, let Y¯τ = (y¯t)
⊤
t∈[τ ] ∈ Rτ×1. We can rewrite, for any τ ,
LSE(τ) = argmin
β
(
X¯τβ − Y¯τ
)⊤ (
X¯τβ − Y¯τ
)
. (1)
Agents are grouped in epochs. The time horizon T is divided into epochs of size n, where n
is chosen by the learner. At the start of every epoch E, the learner updates the posted regression
parameter vector as a function of the history of x¯t, y¯t up until epoch E. We let τ(E) = En denote
the last time step of epoch E. Dτ(E) denotes the set of features that have been modified by at least
one agent by the end of epoch E.
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Algorithm 1: Online Regression with Epoch-Based Strategic modification (Epoch size n)
Learner picks (any) initial βˆ0.
for every epoch E ∈ N do
for t ∈ {(E − 1)n+ 1, . . . , En} do
Agent t reports x¯t ∈M(βˆE−1, ct, Bt).
Learner observes y¯t = β
∗⊤x¯t + εt.
end
Learner picks βˆE ∈ LSE (τ(E)).
end
Examples We first illustrate why unmodified observations are insufficient for any algorithm to
distinguish causal from non-causal features. Consider a setting where non-causal features are convex
combinations of the causal features in the underlying (unmodified) distribution. Absent additional
information, a learner would be faced with degenerate sets of observations that have rank strictly
less than d, which can make accurate recovery of causality impossible:
Example 2.1. Suppose d = 2, β∗ = (1, 0). Suppose feature 1 is causal and feature 2 is non-causal
and correlated with 1: the distribution of unmodified features is such that for any feature vector
x, feature 2 is identical to feature 1 as x(2) = x(1). Then, any regression parameter of the form
β(α) = (α, 1 − α) for α ∈ R assigns agents the same score as β∗. Indeed,
β∗⊤x = x(1) = αx(1) + (1− α)x(2) = β(α)⊤x.
In turn, in the absence of additional information other than the observed features and labels, β∗ is
indistinguishable from any β(α), many of which recover the causality structure poorly (e.g., consider
any α bounded away from 1).
At this point, a reader may wonder why it is important in Example 2.1 to recover the true
causality parameter β∗, rather than simply any vector β that is consistent with all the data observed
so far. A major reason to do so is because only the causal model β∗ can guarantee robustness
in response to agent modifications, and accurately predict labels after agents have changed their
features. This is illustrated in Example 2.2 below:
Example 2.2. Consider the setting of Example 2.1, and imagine agents have much lower cost for
manipulating feature 2 than feature 1. Then, posting a regression parameter vector of the form
(α, 1−α) where α is small enough may lead agents to modify the second, non-causal feature. When
facing such a modification of the form ∆ = (0,∆(2)), (α, 1 − α) predicts label
αx(1) + (1− α) (x(2) + ∆(2)) = x(1) + (1− α)∆(2),
for an agent with x(1) = x(2), while the true label is given by β∗⊤(x + ∆) = x(1). In turn, the
predicted and true labels are different for any α 6= 1.
We next illustrate that strategic agent modifications may aid in recovery of causal features, but
only for those features that individuals actually invest in changing:
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Example 2.3. Consider a setting where d = 3, feature 1 is causal, and features 2 and 3 are non-
causal and correlated with feature 1 as follows: for any feature vector x, x(2), x(3) = x(1). Let
β∗ = (1, 0, 0). Consider a situation in which the labels are noiseless (i.e., ε = 0 almost surely).
Suppose that agents only modify their causal feature by a (possibly random) amount ∆(1).
Note that the difference (in absolute value) between the score obtained by applying a given regres-
sion parameter βˆ and the score obtained by applying β∗ to feature vector x is given by∣∣∣βˆ⊤x− β∗⊤x∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣βˆ(1) (x(1) + ∆(1)) + βˆ(2)x(2) + βˆ(3)x(3) − x(1)−∆(1)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣(βˆ(1) + βˆ(2) + βˆ(3) − 1) x(1) + (βˆ(1) − 1)∆(1)∣∣∣ .
In particular, for appropriate distributions of x and ∆(1), the predictions of βˆ and β∗ coincide if
only if βˆ(1) = 1 and βˆ(2) = −βˆ(3). As such, the learner learns after enough observations that
necessarily, β∗(1) = 1. However, any regression parameter vector with βˆ(1) = 1, βˆ(2) + βˆ(3) = 0 is
indistinguishable from β∗, and accurate recovery of β∗(2) and β∗(3) is impossible.
Note that even in the noiseless setting of Example 2.3, only the feature that has been modified
can be recovered accurately. In more complex settings where the true labels are noisy, one should
not hope to recover every feature well, but rather only those that have been modified sufficiently
many times.
3 Recovery Guarantees for Modified Features
In this section, we focus on characterizing the recovery guarantees (with respect to the ℓ2-norm)
of Algorithm 1 at time τ(E) = En for any epoch E, with respect to the features that have been
modified up until τ(E) (that is, in epochs 1 to E). We leave discussion of how the dynamics shape
the set Dτ(E) of modified features to Section 4.
The main result of this section guarantees the accuracy of the βˆE that the learning process
converges to in its interaction with a sequence of strategic agents. The accuracy of the βˆE that is
recovered for a particular feature naturally depends on the number of epochs in which that feature
is modified by the agents. For a feature that is never modified, we have no ability to distinguish
correlation from causation. Recovery improves as the number of observations of the modified variable
increases.
Formally, our recovery guarantee is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1 (ℓ2 Recovery Guarantee for Modified Features). Pick any epoch E. With probability
at least 1− δ, for n ≥ κd2λ
√
τ(E) log(12d/δ),√√√√ ∑
k∈Dτ(E)
(
βˆE(k)− β∗(k)
)2
≤ K
√
dτ(E) log(4d/δ)
λn
,
where K, κ, λ are instance-specific constants that only depend on σ, C, Σ, such that λ > 0.
When the epoch size is chosen so that n = Ω(τ(E)α) for α > 1/2, our recovery guarantee
improves as τ(E) becomes larger. When n = Θ(τ(E)), our bound becomes O(1/
√
τ(E)); this
matches the well-known recovery guarantees of least square regression for a single batch of τ(E)
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i.i.d observations drawn from a non-degenerate distribution of features. When the epoch size n is
sub-linear in τ(E), the accuracy guarantee degrades to O(
√
τ(E)/n). This is because some features
are modified in few epochs,6 that is, Θ(n) times, and the number of times such features are modified
drives how accurately they can be recovered.
Proof sketch for Theorem 3.1. Full proof in Appendix A. We focus on the subspace Vτ(E) of Rd
spanned by the observed features x¯1, . . . , x¯τ(E), and for any z ∈ Rd, we denote by z(Vτ(E)) the
projection of of z onto Vτ(E). First, we show via concentration that in this subspace, the mean-square
error is strongly convex, with parameter Θ(n) (see Claim A.6). This strong convexity parameter is
controlled by the smallest eigenvalue of X¯⊤τ(E)X¯τ(E) over subspace Vτ(E). Formally, we lower bound
this eigenvalue and show that with probability at least 1− δ/2, for n large enough,(
βˆE(Vτ(E))− β∗(Vτ(E))
)⊤
X¯⊤τ(E)X¯τ(E)
(
βˆE(Vτ(E))− β∗(Vτ(E))
)
≥ λn
4
. (2)
Second, we bound the effect of the noise ε on the mean-squared error by O(
√
τ(E)) in Lemma A.3,
once again via concentration. Formally, we abuse notation and let ετ(E) , (εt)
⊤
t∈[τ(E)], and show
that with probability at least 1− δ/2,(
βˆE(Vτ(E))− β∗(Vτ(E))
)⊤
X¯⊤τ(E)ετ(E) ≤
∥∥∥βˆE(Vτ(E))− β∗(Vτ(E))∥∥∥
2
·K
√
dτ(E) log(4d/δ). (3)
Finally, we obtain the result via Lemma A.2, that states that taking the first-order conditions
on the mean-squared error yields X¯⊤τ(E)X¯τ(E)
(
βˆE(Vτ(E))− β∗(Vτ(E))
)
= X¯⊤τ(E)ετ(E),which can be
combined with Equations (2) and (3) to show our bound with respect to sub-space Vτ(E). In turn,
as Dτ(E) defines a sub-space of Vτ(E), our accuracy bound applies to Dτ(E).
Remark 3.2. Theorem 3.1 is not a direct consequence of the classical recovery guarantees of least-
square regression, as they assume X¯⊤τ(E)X¯τ(E) has full rank d. We deal with degenerate distributions
over modified features, that can arise in our setting as per Examples 2.1 and 2.3.
4 Ensuring Exploration via Least Squares Tie-Breaking
In this section, we focus on ensuring that the interaction between the online learning process and
the strategic modification results in modification of a diverse set of variables over time.
Recall we are solving the least-square problem LSE(τ(E)) given in Equation (1) for all epochs
E. When X¯⊤τ(E)X¯τ(E) is invertible, this has a single solution. However, in our setting, it may be
the case that X¯⊤τ(E)X¯τ(E) is rank-deficient (see Examples 2.1, 2.3). In this case, the least-square
problem admits a continuum of solutions. This gives rise to the question of which solutions are
preferable in our setting, and how to break ties between several solutions.
The learner’s choice of regression parameters in each epoch affects the distribution of feature
modifications in subsequent epochs. As the recovery guarantee of Theorem 3.1 only applies to
features that have been modified, we would like our tie-breaking rule to regularly incentivize agents
to modify new features. We first show that a natural, commonly used tie-breaking rule—picking
the minimum norm solution to the least-square problem—may fail to do so:
6In particular, as we will see, we expect correlated, non-causal features to only be modified in a small number of
epochs: once a non-causal feature k has been modified in a few epochs, it is accurately recovered. In further periods
E, the learner sets βˆE(k) close to 0. This disincentivizes further modifications of feature k.
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Example 4.1. Consider a setting with d = 2, β∗ = (1, 2) and noiseless labels, i.e., εt = 0 always.
Suppose that with probability 1, every agent t has features xt = (0, 0), budget Bt = 1, and costs
ct(1) = ct(2) = 1 to modify each feature. We let the tie-breaking pick the solution with the least ℓ2
norm among all solutions to the least-square problem.
Pick any initial regression parameter βˆ0 with βˆ0(1) > βˆ0(2). For every agent t in epoch 1, t
picks modification vector ∆t = (1, 0). This induces observations x¯t = (1, 0), y¯t = 1. The set of
least-square solutions (with error exactly 0) in epoch 1 is then given by {(1, β2) : ∀β2 ∈ R}, and
the minimum-norm solution chosen at the end of epoch 1 is βˆ1 = (1, 0). This solution incentivizes
agents to set ∆t = (1, 0), and Algorithm 1 gets stuck in a loop where every agent t reports x¯t = (1, 0),
and the algorithm posts regression parameter vector βˆE = (1, 0) in response, in every epoch E. The
second feature is never modified by any agent, and is not recovered accurately.
Example 4.1 highlights that a wrong choice of tie-breaking rule can lead Algorithm 1 to explore
the same features over and over again. In response, we propose the following tie-breaking rule,
described in Algorithm 2:
Algorithm 2: Tie-Breaking Scheme at Time τ(E).
Input: Epoch E, observations (x¯1, y¯1), . . . , (x¯τ(E), y¯τ(E)), parameter α
Let Uτ(E) = span
(
x¯1, . . . , x¯τ(E)
)
.
if rank
(Uτ(E)) < d then
Find an orthonormal basis B⊥τ(E) for U⊥τ(E).
Set v =
∑
b∈B⊥
τ(E)
b 6= 0, renormalize v := v‖v‖2 .
Pick βE a vector in LSE(τ(E)) with minimal norm.
Set βˆE = βE + αv.
else
Set βˆE be the unique element in LSE(τ(E)).
end
Output: βˆE .
Intuitively, at the end of epoch E, our tie-breaking rule picks a solution in LSE(τ(E)) with large
norm. This ensures the existence of a feature k 6∈ Dτ(E) that has not yet been modified up until
time τ(E), and that is assigned a large weight by our least-square solution. In turn, this feature is
more likely to be modified in future epochs.
Our main result in this section shows that the tie-breaking rule of Algorithm 2 eventually
incentivizes the agents to modify all d features, allowing for accurate recovery of β∗ in its entirety.
Theorem 4.2 (Recovery Guarantee with Tie-Breaking Scheme (Algorithm 2)). Suppose the epoch
size satisfies n ≥ κd2λ
√
2T log(24d/δ), and take α to be
α ≥ γ
(√
d+
Kd
√
2T log(8d/δ)
λn
)
,
where γ, K, κ, λ are instance-specific constants that only depend on σ, C, Σ, and λ > 0. If T ≥ dn,
we have with probability at least 1− δ that at the end of the last epoch T/n,
∥∥∥βˆT/n − β∗∥∥∥
2
≤ K
√
2dT log(8d/δ)
λn
,
under the tie-breaking rule of Algorithm 2 .
10
Remark 4.3. The bound in Theorem 4.2 provides guidance for selecting the epoch length, so as
to ensure optimal recovery guarantees. Under the natural assumption that T >> d, the optimal
recovery rate is achieved when roughly n = Θ(T/d). This results in an O(d
√
(d log d)/T ) upper
bound on the ℓ2 distance between the recovered regression parameters and β
∗.
Proof sketch of Theorem 4.2. Full proof in Appendix B. For α arbitrarily large, the norm of βˆ
becomes arbitrarily large. Because at the end of epoch E, βˆE guarantees accurate recovery of all
features modified up until time En, it must be that βˆE(k) is arbitrarily large for some feature k
that has not yet been modified. In turn, this feature is modified in epoch E + 1. After d epochs,
and in particular for T ≥ dn, this leads to DT = [d]. The recovery guarantee of Theorem 3.1 then
applies to all features.
5 Conclusions and Future Directions
This paper provides evidence that interaction between an online learner and individuals who strate-
gically modify their features can result in discovery of causal features, also incentivizing individuals
to invest in these features, rather than gaming. In future work, it would be natural to explore this
interaction in richer and more complex settings.
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A Proof of Theorem 3.1
A.1 Preliminaries
A.1.1 Useful concentration
Our proof will require applying the following concentration inequality, derived from Azuma’s in-
equality:
Lemma A.1. Let W1, . . . ,Wτ be random variables in R such that |Wt| ≤ Wmax. Suppose for all
t ∈ [τ ], for all w1, . . . , wt−1,
E [Wt|Wt−1 = wt−1, . . . ,W1 = w1] = 0.
Then, with at least 1− δ, ∣∣∣∣∣
τ∑
t=1
Wt
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤Wmax
√
2τ log(2/δ).
Proof. This is a reformulated version of Azuma’s inequality. To see this, define
Zt =
t∑
i=1
Wi ∀t,
and initialize Z0 = 0. We start by noting that for all t ∈ [τ ], since
Zt =
t∑
i=1
Wi = Wt +
t−1∑
i=1
Wi = Wt + Zt−1,
we have
E [Zt|Zt−1, . . . , Z1] = E [Wt|Zt−1, . . . , Z1] + E [Zt−1|Zt−1, . . . , Z1]
= E [Wt|Zt−1, . . . , Z1] + Zt−1.
Further, it is easy to see that Zi = zi ∀i ∈ [t− 1] if and only if Wi = zi − zi−1 ∀i ∈ [t− 1], hence
E [Wt|Zt−1 = zt−1, . . . , Z1 = z1] = E [Wt|Wi = zi − zi−1 ∀i ∈ [t− 1]] = 0.
Combining the last two equations implies that
E [Zt|Zt−1, . . . , Z1] = Zt−1,
and the Zt’s define a martingale. Since for all t,
|Zt − Zt−1| = |Wt| ≤Wmax,
we can apply Azuma’s inequality to show that with probability at least 1− δ,
|Zτ − Z0| ≥Wmax
√
2τ log(2/δ),
which immediately gives the result.
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A.1.2 Sub-space decomposition and projection
We will also need to divide Rd in several sub-spaces, and project our observations to said subspaces.
Sub-space decomposition We focus on the sub-space generated by the non-modified features
xt’s and the sub-space generated by the feature modifications ∆t’s. We let r be the rank of Σ,
and let λr ≥ . . . ≥ λ1 > 0 be the non-zero eigenvalues of Σ. Further, we let f1, . . . , fr be the unit
eigenvectors (i.e., such that ‖f1‖1 = . . . = ‖fr‖1 = 1) corresponding to eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λr of
Σ. As Σ is a symmetric matrix, f1, . . . , fr are orthonormal. We abuse notations in the proof of
Theorem 3.1 and denote Σ = span(f1, . . . , fr) when clear from context.
For all k, let ek be the unit vector such that ek(k) = 1 and ek(j) = 0 ∀j 6= k. At time τ , we
denote Dτ = span (ek)k∈Dτ the sub-space of Rd spanned by the features in Dτ .
Finally, we let
Vτ = Σ+Dτ = span (f1, . . . , fr) + span (ek)k∈Dτ
be the Minkowski sum of sub-spaces Σ and Dτ .
Projection onto sub-spaces For any vector z, sub-space H of Rd, we write z = z(H) + z(H⊥)
where z(H) is the projection of z onto sub-space H, i.e. is uniquely defined as
z(H) =
∑
q∈B
(z⊤q)q
for any orthonormal basisB ofH. We also let z(H⊥) be the projection on the orthogonal complement
H⊥. In particular, z(H) is orthogonal to z(H⊥). Further, we write X¯τ (H) the matrix whose rows
are given by x¯t(H)⊤ for all t ∈ [τ ].
A.2 Main Proof
Characterization of the least-square estimate via first-order conditions First, for any
least square solution βˆE at time τ(E), we write the first order conditions solved by βˆE
(Vτ(E)), the
projection of βˆE on sub-space Vτ(E). We abuse notations to let ετ(E) , (εt)t∈[τ(E)] the vector of all
εt’s up until time τ(E), and state the result as follows:
Lemma A.2 (First-order conditions projected onto Vτ(E)). Suppose βˆE ∈ LSE(τ(E)). Then,(
X¯τ(E)
(Vτ(E))⊤ X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E)))(βˆE (Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E))) = X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E))⊤ ετ(E).
Proof. For simplicity of notations, we drop all τ(E) indices and subscripts in this proof. Remember
that
LSE = argmin
β
(
X¯β − Y¯ )⊤ (X¯β − Y¯ ) .
Since βˆE ∈ LSE, it must satisfy the first order conditions given by
2X¯⊤
(
X¯βˆE − Y¯
)
= 0,
which can be rewritten as
X¯⊤X¯βˆE = X¯
⊤Y¯ .
15
Second, we note that for all t, xt ∈ span(f1, . . . , fr) and ∆t ∈ span
(
(ek)k∈D
)
(by definition of D).
This immediately implies, in particular, that x¯t = xt +∆t ∈ V. In turn, x¯t (V) = x¯t for all t, and
X¯ = X¯ (V) .
As such, the first order condition can be written
X¯ (V)⊤ X¯ (V) βˆE = X¯ (V)⊤ Y¯ .
Now, we remark that
X¯ (V)⊤ X¯ (V) βˆE =
∑
t∈S
x¯t (V) x¯t (V)⊤ βˆE
=
∑
t∈S
x¯t (V) x¯t (V)⊤ βˆE (V) +
∑
t∈S
x¯t (V) x¯t (V)⊤ βˆE(V⊥)
=
∑
t∈S
x¯t (V) x¯t (V)⊤ βˆE (V)
= X¯ (V)⊤ X¯ (V) βˆE (V) ,
where the second-to-last equality follows from the fact that V and V⊥ are orthogonal, which imme-
diately implies x¯t (V)⊤ βˆE(V⊥) = 0 for all t. To conclude the proof, we note that Y¯ = X¯⊤β∗ + ε =
X¯ (V)⊤ β∗ (V) + ε. Plugging this in the above equation, we obtain that
X¯ (V)⊤ X¯ (V) βˆE (V) = X¯ (V)⊤ X¯ (V)⊤ β∗ (V) + X¯ (V)⊤ ε.
This can be rewritten (
X¯ (V)⊤ X¯ (V)
)(
βˆE (V)− β∗ (V)
)
= X¯ (V)⊤ ε,
which completes the proof.
Upper-bounding the right-hand side of the first order conditions We now use concentra-
tion to give an upper bound on a function of the right-hand side of the first order conditions,(
βˆE
(Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E)))⊤ X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E))⊤ ετ(E).
Lemma A.3. With probability at least 1− δ,(
βˆE
(Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E)))⊤ X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E))⊤ ε
≤
∥∥∥βˆE (Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E))∥∥∥
2
·K ′
√
dτ(E) log(2d/δ).
where K ′ is a constant that only depends on the distribution of costs and the bound σ on the noise.
Proof. Pick any k ∈ [d], and define Wt = x¯t(k)εt. First, we remark that
|x¯t(k)| ≤ |xt(k)|+ |∆t(k)| ≤ 1 + max
k∈[d], i∈[l]
Bi
ci(k)
.
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In turn, |Wt| ≤ K ′ where
K ′ ,
(
1 + max
k∈[d], i∈[l]
Bi
ci(k)
)
σ.
Further, note that both xt(k) and εt are independent of the history of play up through time t− 1,
hence of W1, . . . ,Wt−1, and that εt is further independent of ∆t (the distribution of ∆t is a function
of the currently posted βˆE−1 only, which only depends on the previous time steps). Noting that if
A,B,C are random variables, we have
E
A,B
[AB|C = c] =
∑
a
∑
b
abPr [A = a,B = b|C = c]
=
∑
a
∑
b
abPr [A = a|B = b, C = c] Pr [B = b|C = c]
=
∑
b
b
(∑
a
aPr [A = a|B = b, C = c]
)
Pr [B = b|C = c]
=
∑
b
bE
A
[A|B = b, C = c] Pr [B = b|C = c]
= E
B
[
E
A
[A|B,C = c]B|C = c
]
,
and applying this with A = εt, B = ∆t(k), C = W1 ∩ . . . ∩Wt−1, we obtain
E [Wt|Wt−1, . . . ,W1] = E [x¯t(k)εt|Wt−1, . . . ,W1]
= E [xt(k)εt|Wt−1, . . . ,W1] + E [∆t(k)εt|Wt−1, . . . ,W1]
= E [xt(k)εt] + E
∆t
[
E
εt
[εt|∆t(k),Wt−1, . . . ,W1] ·∆t(k)
∣∣∣∣Wt−1, . . . ,W1
]
= E
xt
[
xt(k) · E
ε
[εt|xt(k)]
]
+ E
∆t
[
∆t(k) · E
εt
[εt]
∣∣∣∣Wt−1, . . . ,W1
]
= 0,
since Eεt [εt] = 0 and Eε [εt|xt(k)] = 0. Hence, we can apply Lemma A.1 and a union bound over
all d features to show that with probability at least 1− δ,
τ(E)∑
t=1
x¯t(k)εt ≥ −K ′
√
2τ(E) log(2d/δ) ∀k ∈ [d].
By Cauchy-Schwarz, we have
(
βˆE (V)− β∗ (V)
)⊤ τ(E)∑
t=1
x¯tεt ≤
∥∥∥βˆE (V)− β∗ (V)∥∥∥
2
·
∥∥∥∥∥∥
τ(E)∑
t=1
x¯tεt
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
∥∥∥βˆE (V)− β∗ (V)∥∥∥
2
√√√√ d∑
k=1
(∑
t
x¯t(k)εt
)2
≤
∥∥∥βˆE (V)− β∗ (V)∥∥∥
2
·K ′
√
2dτ(E) log(2d/δ).
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Strong convexity of the mean-squared error in sub-space V(τ(E)) We give a lower bound
on the eigenvalues of X¯⊤X¯ on sub-space V(τ(E)), so as to show that at time τ(E), any least square
solution βˆE satisfies(
βˆE
(Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E)))⊤ X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E))⊤ X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E)) (βˆE (Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E)))
≥ Ω(n)
∥∥∥βˆE (Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E))∥∥∥2
2
.
To do so, we will need the following concentration inequalities:
Lemma A.4. Suppose E [xt] = 0. Fix τ(E) = En for some E ∈ N. With probability at least 1− δ,
we have that
τ(E)∑
t=1
z⊤xtx
⊤
t z ≥
(
λrτ(E)− 2rd
√
τ(E) log(6r/δ)
)
‖z‖22 ∀z ∈ Σ,
and
τ(E)∑
t=1
z⊤∆t∆
⊤
t z ≥
(
min
i,k
{
πi
(
Bi
ci(k)
)2}
n−
(
max
i,k
{
Bi
ci(k)
})2√
2n log(6d/δ)
)
‖z‖22 ∀z ∈ Dτ(E)
and
τ(E)∑
t=1
z⊤xt∆
⊤
t z ≥ −2max
i,k
{
Bi
ci(k)
}
d
√
τ(E) log(6d/δ)‖z‖22 ∀z ∈ Rd.
Proof. Deferred to Appendix A.2.1.
We will also need the following statement on the norm of the projections of any z ∈ V to D and
Σ:
Lemma A.5. Let
λ(D,Σ) = inf
z∈D+Σ
‖z(D)‖2 + ‖z(Σ)‖2
s.t. ‖z‖2 = 1.
Then, λ(D,Σ) > 0.
Proof. With respect to the Euclidean metric, the objective function is continuous in z (the or-
thogonal projection operators are linear hence continuous functions of z and z → ‖z‖2 also is a
continuous function), and its feasible set is compact (as it is a sphere in a bounded-dimensional
space over real values). By the extreme value theorem, the optimization problem admits an opti-
mal solution, i.e., there exists z∗ with ‖z∗‖2 = 1 such that λ(D,Σ) = ‖z∗(D)‖2 + ‖z∗(Σ)‖2. Now,
supposing λ(D,Σ) ≤ 0, it must necessarily be the case that z(D) = 0, z(Σ) = 0. In particular, this
means z is orthogonal to both D and Σ. In turn, z must be orthogonal to every vector in D + Σ;
since z ∈ D +Σ, this is only possible when z = 0, contradicting ‖z‖2 = 1.
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We can now move onto the proof of our lower bound for(
βˆE
(Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E)))⊤ X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E))⊤ X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E)) (βˆE (Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E))) .
Corollary A.6. Fix τ(E) = En for some E ∈ N. With probability at least 1− δ,(
βˆE
(Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E)))⊤ X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E))⊤ X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E)) (βˆE (Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E)))
≥
(
λn
2
− κ′d2
√
τ(E) log(6d/δ)
)∥∥∥βˆE (Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E))∥∥∥2
2
,
for some constants κ′, λ that only depend on σ, C, and Σ, with λ > 0.
Proof. Since it is clear from context, we drop all τ(E) subscripts in the notation of this proof. First,
we remark that
z⊤X¯⊤X¯z =
∑
t
z⊤x¯tx¯
⊤
t z
=
∑
t
z⊤xtx
⊤
t z +
∑
t
z⊤∆t∆
⊤
t z + 2
∑
t
z⊤∆tz
⊤xt.
We have by Lemma A.5 that for all z ∈ V = D +Σ,
‖z(D)‖2 + ‖z(Σ)‖2 ≥ λ(D,Σ)‖z‖2.
Let λ(Σ) , minD⊂[d] λ(D,Σ). Since there are finitely many subsets D of [d] (and corresponding
sub-spaces D) and since for all such subsets, λ(D,Σ) > 0, we have that λ(Σ) > 0. Further,
‖z(D)‖2 + ‖z(Σ)‖2 ≥ λ(Σ)‖z‖2.
Therefore, it must be the case that either ‖z(D)‖2 ≥ λ(Σ)2 ‖z‖2 or ‖z(Σ)‖2 ≥ λ(Σ)2 ‖z‖2. We divide
our proof into the corresponding two cases:
1. The first case is when ‖z(Σ)‖2 ≥ λ(Σ)2 ‖z‖2. Then, note that since z⊤∆t∆⊤t z ≥ 0 always, we
have ∑
t
z⊤x¯tx¯
⊤
t z ≥
∑
t
z⊤xtx
⊤
t z + 2
∑
t
z⊤∆tz
⊤xt
=
∑
t
z(Σ)⊤xtx
⊤
t z(Σ) + 2
∑
t
z⊤∆tz
⊤xt,
where the last equality follows from the fact that xt ∈ Σ and z = z(Σ)+z(Σ⊥). By Lemma A.4,
we get that for some constant C1 that depends only on C,∑
t
z⊤x¯tx¯
⊤
t z
≥
(
λrτ(E)− 2rd
√
τ(E) log(6r/δ)
)
‖z(Σ)‖22 − C1d
√
τ(E) log(6d/δ)‖z‖22
≥
(
λ(Σ)λr
2
τ(E)− λ(Σ)rd
√
τ(E) log(6r/δ) − C1d
√
τ(E) log(6d/δ)
)
‖z‖22
≥
(
λ(Σ)λr
2
τ(E)− λ(Σ)d2
√
τ(E) log(6d/δ) − C1d
√
τ(E) log(6d/δ)
)
‖z‖22.
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(The second step assumes λrτ(E) − 2rd
√
τ(E) log(6r/δ) ≥ 0. When this is negative, the
bound trivially holds as
∑
t z
⊤x¯tx¯
⊤
t z ≥ 0.)
2. The second case arises when ‖z(D)‖2 ≥ λ(Σ)2 ‖z‖2. Note that∑
t
z⊤x¯tx¯
⊤
t z ≥
∑
t
z⊤∆t∆
⊤
t z + 2
∑
t
z⊤∆tz
⊤xt
=
∑
t
z(D)⊤∆t∆⊤t z(D) + 2
∑
t
z⊤∆tz
⊤xt,
as ∆t ∈ D and z = z(D) + z(D⊥). By Lemma A.4, it follows that for some constants C2, C3
that only depend on C,∑
t
z⊤x¯tx¯
⊤
t z
≥
(
nmin
i,k
{
πi
(
Bi
ci(k)
)2}
−C2
√
n log(6d/δ)
)
‖z(D)‖22 − C3d
√
τ(E) log(6d/δ)‖z‖22
≥
(
λ(Σ)n
2
min
i,k
{
πi
(
Bi
ci(k)
)2}
− λ(Σ)C2
2
√
n log(6d/δ) −C3d
√
τ(E) log(6d/δ)
)
‖z‖22
≥
(
λ(Σ)n
2
min
i,k
{
πi
(
Bi
ci(k)
)2}
− λ(Σ)C2
2
√
τ(E) log(6d/δ) − C3d
√
τ(E) log(6d/δ)
)
‖z‖22.
Noting that by definition λr > 0 and mini,k
{
πi
(
Bi
ci(k)
)2}
> 0, and picking the worse of the two
above bounds on
∑
t z
⊤x¯tx¯
⊤
t z concludes the proof with
λ =
λ(Σ)
2
min
(
λr,min
i,k
{
πi
(
Bi
ci(k)
)2})
> 0.
We can now prove Theorem 3.1. By Lemma A.2, we have that(
X¯τ(E)
(Vτ(E))⊤ X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E)))(βˆE (Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E))) = X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E))⊤ ετ(E),
which immediately yields
(
βˆE
(Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E)))⊤ (X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E))⊤ X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E)))(βˆE (Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E)))
=
(
βˆE
(Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E)))⊤ X¯ (Vτ(E))⊤ ετ(E)
by performing matrix multiplication with
(
βˆE
(Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E)))⊤ on both sides on the first-
order conditions. Further, by Lemma A.3, Corollary A.6, and a union bound, we get that with
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probability at least 1− δ,
(
βˆE
(Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E)))⊤ X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E))⊤ X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E)) (βˆE (Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E)))
≥
(
λn
2
− κ′d2
√
τ(E) log(12d/δ)
)∥∥∥βˆE (Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E))∥∥∥2
2
,
and (
βˆE
(Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E)))⊤ X¯τ(E) (Vτ(E))⊤ ε
≤
∥∥∥βˆE (Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E))∥∥∥
2
·K ′
√
dτ(E) log(4d/δ).
Combining the two above inequalities with the first-order conditions yields
∥∥∥βˆE (Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E))∥∥∥
2
≤ K
′
√
dτ(E) log(4d/δ)
λn
2 − κ′d2
√
τ(E) log(12d/δ)
.
For
n ≥ 4κ
′d2
λ
√
τ(E) log(12d/δ),
the bound becomes
∥∥∥βˆE (Vτ(E))− β∗ (Vτ(E))∥∥∥
2
≤ 4K
′
√
dτ(E) log(4d/δ)
λn
.
The proof concludes by letting K , 4K ′, κ , 4κ′ and noting that since Dτ(E) ⊂ Vτ(E) by con-
struction, the statement holds true over Dτ(E) (projecting onto a subspace cannot increase the
ℓ2-norm).
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma A.4
For the first statement, note that for all k 6= j ≤ r,
E
[
f⊤k xtx
⊤
t fj
]
= f⊤k E
[
xtx
⊤
t
]
fj = λjf
⊤
k fj,
as fj is (by definition) an eigenvector of Σ = E
[
xtx
⊤
t
]
for eigenvalue λj. Note that the f
⊤
j xtx
⊤
t fk =
(f⊤j xt)(f
⊤
k xt) are random variables that are independent across t. Further, by Cauchy-Schwarz,∣∣∣(f⊤k xt)(f⊤j xt)∣∣∣ ≤ ‖fk‖2‖fj‖2‖xt‖22 = ‖xt‖22 ≤ d.
Therefore, we can apply Hoeffding with a union bound over the r2 choices of (fk, fj) to show that
with probability at least 1− δ′,∣∣∣∣∣∣
τ(E)∑
t=1
f⊤k xtx
⊤
t fj − λjτ(E)f⊤k fj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ d
√
2τ(E) log(2r2/δ′).
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Note now that for all z ∈ Σ, we can write z =∑rk=1 (z⊤fk) fk, and as such∣∣∣∣∣∣
τ(E)∑
t=1
z⊤xtx
⊤
t z −
r∑
k,j=1
(z⊤fk)(z
⊤fj)λjτ(E)f
⊤
k fj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
τ(E)∑
t=1
r∑
k,j=1
(z⊤fk)(z
⊤fj)f
⊤
k xtx
⊤
t fj −
r∑
k,j=1
(z⊤fk)(z
⊤fj)λjτ(E)f
⊤
k fj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
r∑
k,j=1
(z⊤fk)(z
⊤fj)
(∑
t
f⊤k xtx
⊤
t fj − λjτ(E)f⊤k fj
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ d
√
2τ(E) log(2r2/δ′)
r∑
k,j=1
|z⊤fk||z⊤fj|
≤ rd
√
2τ(E) log(2r2/δ′)‖z‖22,
where the last step follows from the fact that by Cauchy-Schwarz,
r∑
k=1
|z⊤fk| ≤
√√√√ r∑
k=1
12
√√√√ r∑
k=1
(z⊤fk)2 =
√
r‖z‖2.
Hence, for z ∈ Σ, remembering f⊤k fj = 0 when k 6= j and f⊤k fk = 1, and noting ‖z‖22 =∑r
k=1(z
⊤fk)
2, we get that
τ(E)∑
t=1
z⊤xtx
⊤
t z ≥
r∑
k,j=1
(z⊤fk)(z
⊤fj)λjτ(E)f
⊤
k fj − rd
√
2τ(E) log(2r2/δ′)‖z‖22
=
r∑
k=1
λkτ(E)(z
⊤fk)
2 − rd
√
2τ(E) log(2r2/δ′)‖z‖22
≥ λrτ(E)
r∑
k=1
(z⊤fk)
2 − rd
√
2τ(E) log(2r2/δ′)‖z‖22
=
(
λrτ(E)− 2rd
√
τ(E) log(2r/δ′)
)
‖z‖22.
For the second statement, we remind the reader that the costs of modification are such that∣∣∆t(k)2∣∣ ≤ (maxi,j { Bici(j)})2, and that within any epoch φ, the ∆t’s are independent of each other.
We can therefore apply Hoeffding’s inequality and a union bound (over k ∈ Dτ(E) ⊂ [d]) to show
that with probability at least 1− δ′, for any k ∈ Dτ(E), there exists an epoch φ(k) ≤ E (pick any φ
in which k is modified) such that
∑
t∈φ(k)
e⊤k ∆t∆
⊤
t ek ≥ nE
[
∆t(k)
2
]− (max
i,j
{
Bi
ci(j)
})2√
2n log(d/δ′)
≥ n min
i∈[l],j∈[d]
{
πi
(
Bi
ci(j)
)2}
−
(
max
i,j
{
Bi
ci(j)
})2√
2n log(d/δ′).
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The last inequality holds noting that k can be modified in period φ(k) only if there exists a cost
type i on the support of C such that k is a best response to βˆφ(k)−1; in turn, k is modified with
probability πi by amount ∆(k) = Bi/ci(k), leading to
E
[
∆t(k)
2
] ≥ πi( Bi
ci(k)
)2
.
Since ∆t(k)∆t(j) = 0 when k 6= j as a single direction is modified at a time, note that for all
z ∈ Dτ(E), we have∑
t≤τ(E)
z⊤∆t∆
⊤
t z
=
∑
t≤τ(E)
d∑
k=1
∆t(k)
2z⊤eke
⊤
k z
=
d∑
k=1
∑
t≤τ(E)
∆t(k)
2(z⊤ek)
2
≥
∑
k∈Dτ(E)
∑
t∈φ(k)
∆t(k)
2(z⊤ek)
2
≥
∑
k∈Dτ(E)
(
n min
i∈[l],j∈[d]
{
πi
(
Bi
ci(j)
)2}
−
(
max
i,j
{
Bi
ci(j)
})2√
2n log(d/δ′)
)
(z⊤ek)
2
=
(
n min
i∈[l],j∈[d]
{
πi
(
Bi
ci(j)
)2}
−
(
max
i,j
{
Bi
ci(j)
})2√
2n log(d/δ′)
) ∑
k∈Dτ(E)
(z⊤ek)
2.
For z ∈ Dτ(E),
∑
k∈Dτ(E)
(z⊤ek)
2 = ‖z‖22, and the second inequality immediately holds.
Finally, let us prove the last inequality. Take (k, j) ∈ [d]2, and let us write Wt = e⊤k xt∆⊤t ej .
First, note that xt and ∆t are independent: in epoch φ, the distribution of ∆t is a function of βˆφ−1
(and C) only, which only depends on the realizations of x, ε, ∆ in previous time steps. Further, xt
is independent of the history of features and modifications up until time t − 1 included. Hence, it
must be the case that
E [Wt|Wt−1, . . . ,W1] = E
[
E
[
e⊤k xt
∣∣∣∆t,Wt−1, . . . ,W1]∆⊤t ej∣∣∣Wt−1, . . . ,W1]
= E
[
E
[
e⊤k xt
]
∆⊤t ej
∣∣∣Wt−1, . . . ,W1]
= E
[
e⊤k xt
]
· E
[
∆⊤t ej
∣∣∣Wt−1, . . . ,W1]
= 0,
where the last equality follows from the fact that E [xt] = 0. Further,
∣∣∣e⊤k xt∆⊤t ej∣∣∣ = |xt(k)||∆t(j)| ≤ max
i,k
{
Bi
ci(k)
}
.
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We can therefore apply Lemma A.1 and a union bound over all (k, j) ∈ [d]2 to show that with
probability at least 1− δ′,∣∣∣∣∣∣
τ(E)∑
t=1
e⊤k xt∆
⊤
t ej
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxi,k
{
Bi
ci(k)
}√
2τ(E) log(2d2/δ′).
In particular, we get that for all z ∈ Rd,
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
t∈E
z⊤xt∆
⊤
t z
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k,j
∑
t∈E
(z⊤ek)(z
⊤ej)e
⊤
k xt∆
⊤
t ej
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
k,j
|z⊤ek||z⊤ej |
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
t∈E
e⊤k xt∆
⊤
t ej
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
i,k
{
Bi
ci(k)
}√
2τ(E) log(2d2/δ′)
(∑
k
|z⊤ek|
)2
≤ 2dmax
i,k
{
Bi
ci(k)
}√
τ(E) log(2d/δ′)‖z‖22,
where the last step follows from the fact that by Cauchy-Schwarz,
(∑
k
|z⊤ek|
)2
=
(∑
k
|z(k)|
)2
≤
∑
k
12 ·
∑
k
z(k)2 = d · ‖z‖22.
We conclude the proof with a union bound over all three inequalities, taking δ′ = 3δ.
B Proof of Theorem 4.2
We drop the τ(E) subscripts when clear from context. We first note that βˆE is a least-square
solution.
Claim B.1.
βˆE ∈ LSE(τ(E)).
Proof. This follows immediately from noting that
(
X¯βˆE − Y¯
)⊤ (
X¯βˆE − Y¯
)
=
(
X¯βE − Y¯
)⊤ (
X¯βE − Y¯
)
,
as X¯⊤v = X¯(U)⊤v = 0 by definition of U , and since v ∈ U⊥.
Second, we show that βˆE has large norm:
Claim B.2. ∥∥∥βˆE∥∥∥
2
≥ α.
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Proof. First, we note that necessarily, βE ∈ Uτ(E). Suppose not, then we can write
βE = βE
(Uτ(E))+ βE (U⊥τ(E)) ,
with βE
(
U⊥τ(E)
)
6= 0. By the same argument as in Claim B.1, βE
(Uτ(E)) is a least-square solution.
Using orthogonality of Uτ(E) and U⊥τ(E) and the fact that
∥∥∥βE (U⊥τ(E))∥∥∥2 > 0, we have
‖βE‖2 =
∥∥βE (Uτ(E))∥∥22 +
∥∥∥βE (U⊥τ(E))∥∥∥2
2
>
∥∥βE (Uτ(E))∥∥22 .
This contradicts βE being a minimum norm least-square solution. Hence, it must be the case that
βE ∈ Uτ(E). Since v ∈ U⊥τ(E), we have that βE and v are orthogonal with ‖v‖2 = 1, implying∥∥∥βˆE∥∥∥2
2
= ‖βE‖22 + α2‖v‖22 ≥ α2.
This concludes the proof.
We argue that such a solution places a large amount of weight on currently unexplored features:
Lemma B.3. At time τ(E), suppose rank
(Uτ(E)) ≤ [d]. Suppose n ≥ κd2λ √τ(E) log(12d/δ′). Take
any α with
α ≥ γ
(√
d+
Kd
√
T log(4d/δ′)
λn
)
,
where γ is a constant that depends only on C. With probability at least 1− δ′, there exists i ∈ [l] and
a feature k /∈ Dτ(E) with ∣∣∣βˆE(k)∣∣∣
ci(k)
>
∣∣∣βˆE(j)∣∣∣
ci(j)
, ∀j ∈ Dτ(E).
Proof. Since βˆE ∈ LSE(τ(E)), it must be by Theorem 3.1 that with probability at least 1− δ′,√∑
k∈D
(
βˆE(k)− β∗(k)
)2
≤ K
√
dτ(E) log(4d/δ′)
λn
≤ K
√
dT log(4d/δ′)
λn
.
(4)
First, since z →√∑k∈D z(k)2 defines a norm (in fact, the ℓ2-norm in R|D|), it must be the case
that √∑
k∈D
(z(k) − z′(k))2 ≥
√∑
k∈D
z(k)2 −
√∑
k∈D
z′(k)2.
In turn, plugging this in Equation (4), we obtain√∑
k∈D
βˆE(k)2 ≤
√∑
k∈D
β∗(k)2 +
K
√
dT log(4d/δ′)
λn
≤ ‖β∗‖2 + K
√
dT log(4d/δ′)
λn
≤
√
d+
K
√
dT log(4d/δ′)
λn
.
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By the triangle inequality and the lemma’s assumption, we also have that√∑
k∈D
βˆE(k)2 +
√∑
k/∈D
βˆE(k)2 ≥ ‖βˆ‖2 ≥ α.
Combining the last two equations, we obtain
√
d+
K
√
dT log(4d/δ′)
λn
+
√∑
k/∈D
βˆE(k)2,≥ α
which implies that for α ≥ γ
(√
d+
Kd
√
T log(4d/δ′)
λn
)
, we have:
√∑
k/∈D
βˆE(k)2 ≥ α−
√
d− K
√
dT log(4d/δ′)
λn
≥ α−
√
d− Kd
√
T log(4d/δ′)
λn
≥
√
d (γ − 1)
(
1 +
K
√
dT log(4d/δ′)
λn
)
.
Second, note that Equation (4) implies immediately that for any j ∈ DT ,
∣∣∣βˆE(j) − β∗(j)∣∣∣ ≤ K
√
dT log(4d/δ′)
λn
,
and in turn,
∣∣∣βˆE(j)∣∣∣ ≤ |β∗(j)| + K
√
dT log(4d/δ′)
λn
≤ 1 + K
√
dT log(4d/δ′)
λn
.
Therefore, √∑
k/∈D
βˆE(k)2 ≥
√
d (γ − 1)max
j∈D
βˆE(j).
Hence, there must exist feature k 6∈ D with
βˆE(k) ≥ (γ − 1)max
j∈D
βˆE(j).
Picking γ such that for some i ∈ [l],
γ − 1 ≥ max
j∈D
ci(k)
ci(j)
yields the result immediately.
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The proof of Theorem 4.2 follows directly from Lemma B.3 and a union bound over the first d
epochs. With probability at least 1− dδ′, for every epoch E ∈ [d], there is a feature k /∈ Dτ(E) such
that for some i ∈ [l], ∣∣∣βˆE(k)∣∣∣
ci(k)
>
∣∣∣βˆE(j)∣∣∣
ci(j)
∀j ∈ Dτ(E).
This implies that there exists k ∈ Dτ(E+1) but k /∈ Dτ(E). Applying this d times, we have that if
T ≥ dn, necessarily DT = [d]. We can then apply Theorem 3.1 to then show that with probability
at least 1− δ′
∥∥∥βˆT/n − β∗∥∥∥
2
≤ K
√
dT log(4d/δ′)
λn
.
Taking a union bound over the two above events and δ = 2dδ′, we get the theorem statement with
probability at least 1− δ′ (d+ 1) ≥ 1− δ.
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